The Third Reich and German Morale
How The Third Reich Responded to Reports of Declining German Morale
Aug 24, 2008
The winter of 1942-43 saw a turning point in Germany's military successes. The defeats at Stalingrad and in North Africa provoked serious reservations regarding Germany's ability to overpower the Allies.
Hitler believed that 'total mobilization' was essential in order to win the war, claiming that this had thwarted Germany in 1918. As such, the need to 'slap the face of every German who wavers in his loyalty' was broadly felt in the Party, particularly in the upper echelons.
Exhortation
On 23 April 1942, following significant air attacks, the German newspaper Kieler Neueste Nachrichten stated that: 'The best shelter against air-attacks is a strong heart, and not concrete'. Similarly, on 9 April 1942 Schwarze Korps, the extremist S.S. Paper wrote: 'Let us 'activize' the spirit of sacrifice'.
These exhortations hoped to maintain the solidarity of the Volk, ensuring that the population remained committed to the German cause and subsequently to the Party.
As the war progressed exhortations became more extreme. In 1944, when most civilians had accepted defeat, front line soldiers were called upon to speak for six minutes before the newsreel and 'exhort the public to hold out'. However, exhortation alone was not enough.
Atrocity Propaganda
A constant stream of setbacks forced propaganda to operate on a day-to-day basis defined by enemy advances and German retreats.
In October 1944 propaganda capitalized on the 'bloodbath' staged by Soviet troops in the East Prussian village of Hemmersdorf. Monstrous Soviet lust for blood was denounced in the layout and the headings of the media coverage.
The propaganda was not well received. Many felt it hypocritical to accuse others of cruelty, considering the behaviour of the brutal S.S. In spite of this, it is widely considered that the propaganda was successful, given that it ignited fear of the enemy among the German population. Robert Edwin Herzstein claimed that the 'propaganda achieved notable success despite the complaints and the jokes...People feared the consequences of defeat, and that was the main thing'.
Brutality
By 1945 most Germans desired an end to the war which unsurprisingly led to a decline in the fighting spirit, Loyalty to the Party could not outweigh the probability of defeat or the wish to protect homes and livelihoods from destruction. Cologne welcomed the Americans with white kerchiefs and Rhine wine and the heavily fortified area of Trier fell into enemy hands without a fight. Goebbels felt that everywhere Germans were exchanging the Swastika for the white flag.
On 3 April 1945 Himmler declared that 'where a white flag appears all male persons of the house concerned are to be shot'. Subsequently standing courts with emergency powers to hand out rapid judgments including the death penalty were established.
Bormann declared 'whoever is not ready to fight for his people, but rather fails them in their most serious hour, is not worthy of living, and therefore must be turned over to the hangman'.
In Bad Windesheim, the women of the town engaged in open mutiny against the move to make it part of a defensive area for the retreat of a German division. When the Gestapo in Nuremberg learned of the incident they sent two S.S. men, one of whom shot the designated leader three times in front of her husband - once in the neck, once in the left eye and once in the mouth.
Summary
The Third Reich desperately attempted to address all reports of declining German morale in order to contribute to the war effort. It responded rapidly and decisively, utilizing a variety of methods to attain the most effective results.
Sources
Earl R. Beck, Under the Bombs: The German Home Front 1942-1945, (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1986)
Robert E. Herzstein, The War that Hitler Won: The Most Famous Propaganda Campaign in History, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1979)
Jeremy Noakes (ed.) Nazism 1919-1945: Volume IV The German Home Front in World War II, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2006)
W.W. Schutz and B. De. Sevin, The German Home Front, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1943)
Marlis G. Steinert, Hitler's war and the Germans: Public Mood and Attitude during the Second World War, (Ohio:Ohio University Press, 1977)
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